Hello,
I always see some resistance from product teams to implements CSRF protection
with the argument that
This attacks requires too many prerequisites. User has to logged-in. Has to be
enticed to click on some link. Has to click on that link etc etc.
I know that social engineering is prevalent and enticing is not very remote
possibility.
But want to know how do you guys impart importance of CSRF among your product
teams?
Are you aware of any exploitation method other than social engineering/link
enticing?
I am interested in knowing thoughts about this and not about technical details
of exploitation as I am aware of them.
Thanks,
Rohit Pitke
Hi,
On 04/27/2011 06:24 PM, Rohit Pitke wrote:
Hello,
I always see some resistance from product teams to implements CSRF
protection with the argument that
This attacks requires too many prerequisites. User has to logged-in.
Has to be enticed to click on some link. Has to click on that link etc
etc.
Yep, but it only needs to happen once and as time passes the chances of
happening will steadily go up.
I know that social engineering is prevalent and enticing is not very
remote possibility.
But want to know how do you guys impart importance of CSRF among your
product teams?
Are you aware of any exploitation method other than social
engineering/link enticing?
Worst case scenario is that a high-traffic website has been compromised
(using XSS for example) so as to realize an attack against a CSRF
vulnerable site.
So if -- let's say -- PayPal is vulnerable to CSRF and Slashdot had been
made to include a piece of JS that requests Paypal to transfer money
from a user's account to the account of evil.attacker@mail.com
then every Paypal user that visits Slashdot will be robbed.
And since Slashdot has a ridiculous amount of traffic and a high
percentage of the visitors will have Paypal accounts the attacker will
be able to retire to the Barbados.
Cheers,
Tasos L.
I am interested in knowing thoughts about this and not about technical
details of exploitation as I am aware of them.
Thanks,
Rohit Pitke
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Am 27.04.11 19:24, schrieb Rohit Pitke:
Hello,
I always see some resistance from product teams to implements CSRF protection
with the argument that
This attacks requires too many prerequisites. User has to logged-in. Has to be
enticed to click on some link. Has to click on that link etc etc.
There're a couple of myths about exploitability and proper protection of CSRF
around. Folowing applies if not proper protected:
* CSRF is possible without XSS
* CSRF is not limited to GET requests
* CSRF is not limited to dynamic content
* CSRF does not (always) require GET or POST parameters
* CSRF can either be on same site or on another site (no SOP)
* CSRF does not require any active scripting in the browser
* CSRF is not limited to cookie-based sessions (Basic/Digest Auth. and
even Card-Readers can be vulnerable)
* idempotent actions can be vulnerable
* CSRF does not require clicking something
Some of the above need proper implementation of business logic, while some
require a proper protection mechanism. I.g. both is necessary to inhibit CSRF.
I know that social engineering is prevalent and enticing is not very remote
possibility.
As CSRF can often be hidden anywhere, it works without social engineering.
But want to know how do you guys impart importance of CSRF among your product
teams?
Are you aware of any exploitation method other than social engineering/link
enticing?
I am interested in knowing thoughts about this and not about technical details
of exploitation as I am aware of them.
Hope this helps to strengthen the threat.
Achim
In addition to what's been mentioned already by the fine folks before
this email, remember that CSRF can also be exploited within the
intranet itself: there's also the insider problem needs to be
considered too.
Ray.
On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 5:09 AM, Achim Hoffmann websec10@sic-sec.org wrote:
Am 27.04.11 19:24, schrieb Rohit Pitke:
Hello,
I always see some resistance from@ product teams to implements CSRF protection
with the argument that
This attacks requires too many prerequisites. User has to logged-in. Has to be
enticed to click on some link. Has to click on that link etc etc.
There're a couple of myths about exploitability and proper protection of CSRF
around. Folowing applies if not proper protected:
* CSRF is possible without XSS
* CSRF is not limited to GET requests
* CSRF is not limited to dynamic content
* CSRF does not (always) require GET or POST parameters
* CSRF can either be on same site or on another site (no SOP)
* CSRF does not require any active scripting in the browser
* CSRF is not limited to cookie-based sessions (Basic/Digest Auth. and
even Card-Readers can be vulnerable)
* idempotent actions can be vulnerable
* CSRF does not require clicking something
Some of the above need proper implementation of business logic, while some
require a proper protection mechanism. I.g. both is necessary to inhibit CSRF.
I know that social engineering is prevalent and enticing is not very remote
possibility.
As CSRF can often be hidden anywhere, it works without social engineering.
But want to know how do you guys impart importance of CSRF among your product
teams?
Are you aware of any exploitation method other than social engineering/link
enticing?
I am interested in knowing thoughts about this and not about technical details
of exploitation as I am aware of them.
Hope this helps to strengthen the threat.
Achim
The Web Security Mailing List
WebSecurity RSS Feed
http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss
Join WASC on LinkedIn http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/83336/4B20E4374DBA
WASC on Twitter
http://twitter.com/wascupdates
websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
http://lists.webappsec.org/mailman/listinfo/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org