EO
Erlend Oftedal
Mon, May 23, 2011 1:56 PM
I'm wondering if you might want a max size, but just not 14 characters. Maybe 256 or 1024.
Reason: you don't want to hash a 2 GB password 1000 times => DOS.
Erlend
Gautam itsecanalyst@gmail.com wrote:
Claudio, Albino and James, You gave me the exact answer I was looking for,
i know about hashing and other things, however the entropy stuff probably
was known to me in full. I read a couple of papers from NIST last night to
understand this better.
I am also going to add the 2nd factor auth in my recommendation, since most
of the stuff is what you know, what you have is where I want to take this
and probably What you are will be next.
Thanks to all.
Gautam
On Sun, May 22, 2011 at 11:24 AM, James Manico jim@manico.net wrote:
Then again, hashing and salting is not enough for secure password storage.
- Use a strong/modern hash
- Use a cryptographically strong salt
2a) Isolate that salt from the actual hash
- Iterate the hashing of the pass and salt 1000 times (as of y2k,
doubling that iteration value every three years when you re-hash to
slow down re-construction of the custom hash table if the salt is know
by the attacker)
- For %#^* sakes, stop depending on password as the only factor for
authentication. Shifting to 2-factor strategies decreases the need for
strong password policy or storage mechanisms.
Jim Manico
On May 22, 2011, at 7:46 PM, Claudio Telmon claudio@telmon.org wrote:
On 05/22/2011 12:33 AM, Gautam wrote:
Now my delima is
SHA256(AAA) = some 256 bit hash
now
SHA256(AAABB) = is also 256 bit hash
so with this reasoning will it make sense if i say no limit or just a
reasonable limit of 14 character since the result is always going to be
128bit text be it 8 characters or 14 characters.
A good hash function can provide you an entropy which is limited by the
length of the output, but the entropy available in the input domain is
also a limit. 14 characters as input from a user are not random bits and
won't provide 128 bit of entropy for the result. If users are permitted
(and suggested) to choose long passphrases, they may end up feeding the
function with enough entropy. If they are limited to 14 characters, they
will select passwords that will be shorter that 14 characters and are
not random, so they will always feed less that 128 bit of entropy to the
function, and the output will also have less that 128 bits of entropy,
even if it is 128 bit long.
ciao
--
Claudio Telmon
claudio@telmon.org
http://www.telmon.org
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websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
I'm wondering if you might want a max size, but just not 14 characters. Maybe 256 or 1024.
Reason: you don't want to hash a 2 GB password 1000 times => DOS.
Erlend
Gautam <itsecanalyst@gmail.com> wrote:
> Claudio, Albino and James, You gave me the exact answer I was looking for,
>i know about hashing and other things, however the entropy stuff probably
>was known to me in full. I read a couple of papers from NIST last night to
>understand this better.
>
>I am also going to add the 2nd factor auth in my recommendation, since most
>of the stuff is what you know, what you have is where I want to take this
>and probably What you are will be next.
>
>Thanks to all.
>
>Gautam
>
>On Sun, May 22, 2011 at 11:24 AM, James Manico <jim@manico.net> wrote:
>
>> Then again, hashing and salting is not enough for secure password storage.
>>
>> 1) Use a strong/modern hash
>> 2) Use a cryptographically strong salt
>> 2a) Isolate that salt from the actual hash
>> 3) Iterate the hashing of the pass and salt 1000 times (as of y2k,
>> doubling that iteration value every three years when you re-hash to
>> slow down re-construction of the custom hash table if the salt is know
>> by the attacker)
>> 4) For %#^* sakes, stop depending on password as the only factor for
>> authentication. Shifting to 2-factor strategies decreases the need for
>> strong password policy or storage mechanisms.
>>
>> Jim Manico
>>
>> On May 22, 2011, at 7:46 PM, Claudio Telmon <claudio@telmon.org> wrote:
>>
>> > On 05/22/2011 12:33 AM, Gautam wrote:
>> >> Now my delima is
>> >>
>> >> SHA256(*AAA*) = some 256 bit hash
>> >>
>> >> now
>> >>
>> >> SHA256(*AAABB*) = is also 256 bit hash
>> >>
>> >> so with this reasoning will it make sense if i say no limit or just a
>> >> reasonable limit of 14 character since the result is always going to be
>> >> 128bit text be it 8 characters or 14 characters.
>> >
>> > A good hash function can provide you an entropy which is limited by the
>> > length of the output, but the entropy available in the input domain is
>> > also a limit. 14 characters as input from a user are not random bits and
>> > won't provide 128 bit of entropy for the result. If users are permitted
>> > (and suggested) to choose long passphrases, they may end up feeding the
>> > function with enough entropy. If they are limited to 14 characters, they
>> > will select passwords that will be shorter that 14 characters and are
>> > not random, so they will always feed less that 128 bit of entropy to the
>> > function, and the output will also have less that 128 bits of entropy,
>> > even if it is 128 bit long.
>> >
>> > ciao
>> >
>> > - Claudio
>> >
>> > --
>> >
>> > Claudio Telmon
>> > claudio@telmon.org
>> > http://www.telmon.org
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > The Web Security Mailing List
>> >
>> > WebSecurity RSS Feed
>> > http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss
>> >
>> > Join WASC on LinkedIn http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/83336/4B20E4374DBA
>> >
>> > WASC on Twitter
>> > http://twitter.com/wascupdates
>> >
>> > websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
>> >
>> http://lists.webappsec.org/mailman/listinfo/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org
>>
>
>_______________________________________________
>The Web Security Mailing List
>
>WebSecurity RSS Feed
>http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss
>
>Join WASC on LinkedIn http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/83336/4B20E4374DBA
>
>WASC on Twitter
>http://twitter.com/wascupdates
>
>websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
>http://lists.webappsec.org/mailman/listinfo/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org
G
Gautam
Mon, May 23, 2011 4:51 PM
Thanks Nilesh, that link helped,
@Erlend, I am going to suggest 256 as max length, since i don't think anyone
would even go close to it and then everything is going be salted-hashed
anyways. One reason i would want to set some MAX length is the client team
wants to check the input again some max value instead of accepting a large
buffer (not fully convinced on this, but have to live with it).
Let me know if it makes sense.
Thanks,
Gautam
On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 6:56 AM, Erlend Oftedal erlend@oftedal.no wrote:
I'm wondering if you might want a max size, but just not 14 characters.
Maybe 256 or 1024.
Reason: you don't want to hash a 2 GB password 1000 times => DOS.
Erlend
Gautam itsecanalyst@gmail.com wrote:
Claudio, Albino and James, You gave me the exact answer I was looking
i know about hashing and other things, however the entropy stuff probably
was known to me in full. I read a couple of papers from NIST last night to
understand this better.
I am also going to add the 2nd factor auth in my recommendation, since
of the stuff is what you know, what you have is where I want to take this
and probably What you are will be next.
Thanks to all.
Gautam
On Sun, May 22, 2011 at 11:24 AM, James Manico jim@manico.net wrote:
Then again, hashing and salting is not enough for secure password
- Use a strong/modern hash
- Use a cryptographically strong salt
2a) Isolate that salt from the actual hash
- Iterate the hashing of the pass and salt 1000 times (as of y2k,
doubling that iteration value every three years when you re-hash to
slow down re-construction of the custom hash table if the salt is know
by the attacker)
- For %#^* sakes, stop depending on password as the only factor for
authentication. Shifting to 2-factor strategies decreases the need for
strong password policy or storage mechanisms.
Jim Manico
On May 22, 2011, at 7:46 PM, Claudio Telmon claudio@telmon.org wrote:
On 05/22/2011 12:33 AM, Gautam wrote:
Now my delima is
SHA256(AAA) = some 256 bit hash
now
SHA256(AAABB) = is also 256 bit hash
so with this reasoning will it make sense if i say no limit or just a
reasonable limit of 14 character since the result is always going to
128bit text be it 8 characters or 14 characters.
A good hash function can provide you an entropy which is limited by
length of the output, but the entropy available in the input domain is
also a limit. 14 characters as input from a user are not random bits
won't provide 128 bit of entropy for the result. If users are
(and suggested) to choose long passphrases, they may end up feeding
function with enough entropy. If they are limited to 14 characters,
will select passwords that will be shorter that 14 characters and are
not random, so they will always feed less that 128 bit of entropy to
Thanks Nilesh, that link helped,
@Erlend, I am going to suggest 256 as max length, since i don't think anyone
would even go close to it and then everything is going be salted-hashed
anyways. One reason i would want to set some MAX length is the client team
wants to check the input again some max value instead of accepting a large
buffer (not fully convinced on this, but have to live with it).
Let me know if it makes sense.
Thanks,
Gautam
On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 6:56 AM, Erlend Oftedal <erlend@oftedal.no> wrote:
> I'm wondering if you might want a max size, but just not 14 characters.
> Maybe 256 or 1024.
> Reason: you don't want to hash a 2 GB password 1000 times => DOS.
>
> Erlend
>
> Gautam <itsecanalyst@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Claudio, Albino and James, You gave me the exact answer I was looking
> for,
> >i know about hashing and other things, however the entropy stuff probably
> >was known to me in full. I read a couple of papers from NIST last night to
> >understand this better.
> >
> >I am also going to add the 2nd factor auth in my recommendation, since
> most
> >of the stuff is what you know, what you have is where I want to take this
> >and probably What you are will be next.
> >
> >Thanks to all.
> >
> >Gautam
> >
> >On Sun, May 22, 2011 at 11:24 AM, James Manico <jim@manico.net> wrote:
> >
> >> Then again, hashing and salting is not enough for secure password
> storage.
> >>
> >> 1) Use a strong/modern hash
> >> 2) Use a cryptographically strong salt
> >> 2a) Isolate that salt from the actual hash
> >> 3) Iterate the hashing of the pass and salt 1000 times (as of y2k,
> >> doubling that iteration value every three years when you re-hash to
> >> slow down re-construction of the custom hash table if the salt is know
> >> by the attacker)
> >> 4) For %#^* sakes, stop depending on password as the only factor for
> >> authentication. Shifting to 2-factor strategies decreases the need for
> >> strong password policy or storage mechanisms.
> >>
> >> Jim Manico
> >>
> >> On May 22, 2011, at 7:46 PM, Claudio Telmon <claudio@telmon.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> > On 05/22/2011 12:33 AM, Gautam wrote:
> >> >> Now my delima is
> >> >>
> >> >> SHA256(*AAA*) = some 256 bit hash
> >> >>
> >> >> now
> >> >>
> >> >> SHA256(*AAABB*) = is also 256 bit hash
> >> >>
> >> >> so with this reasoning will it make sense if i say no limit or just a
> >> >> reasonable limit of 14 character since the result is always going to
> be
> >> >> 128bit text be it 8 characters or 14 characters.
> >> >
> >> > A good hash function can provide you an entropy which is limited by
> the
> >> > length of the output, but the entropy available in the input domain is
> >> > also a limit. 14 characters as input from a user are not random bits
> and
> >> > won't provide 128 bit of entropy for the result. If users are
> permitted
> >> > (and suggested) to choose long passphrases, they may end up feeding
> the
> >> > function with enough entropy. If they are limited to 14 characters,
> they
> >> > will select passwords that will be shorter that 14 characters and are
> >> > not random, so they will always feed less that 128 bit of entropy to
> the
> >> > function, and the output will also have less that 128 bits of entropy,
> >> > even if it is 128 bit long.
> >> >
> >> > ciao
> >> >
> >> > - Claudio
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> >
> >> > Claudio Telmon
> >> > claudio@telmon.org
> >> > http://www.telmon.org
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > The Web Security Mailing List
> >> >
> >> > WebSecurity RSS Feed
> >> > http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss
> >> >
> >> > Join WASC on LinkedIn
> http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/83336/4B20E4374DBA
> >> >
> >> > WASC on Twitter
> >> > http://twitter.com/wascupdates
> >> >
> >> > websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
> >> >
> >>
> http://lists.webappsec.org/mailman/listinfo/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org
> >>
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >The Web Security Mailing List
> >
> >WebSecurity RSS Feed
> >http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss
> >
> >Join WASC on LinkedIn http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/83336/4B20E4374DBA
> >
> >WASC on Twitter
> >http://twitter.com/wascupdates
> >
> >websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
> >
> http://lists.webappsec.org/mailman/listinfo/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org
> _______________________________________________
> The Web Security Mailing List
>
> WebSecurity RSS Feed
> http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss
>
> Join WASC on LinkedIn http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/83336/4B20E4374DBA
>
> WASC on Twitter
> http://twitter.com/wascupdates
>
> websecurity@lists.webappsec.org
> http://lists.webappsec.org/mailman/listinfo/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org
>
--
Regards,
Gautam