[WEB SECURITY] CS#RF (insecure client side rouring)
Stefano Di Paola
stefano.dipaola at mindedsecurity.com
Mon Jul 2 14:00:18 EDT 2012
Hey Erlend,
Absolutely, I'd just like to point out that the Http Parameter Pollution
in its client side nuance is a technique that was used to bypass the
anticsrf against yahoo mail web site (already fixed of course).
http://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2009/05/client-side-http-parameter-pollution.html
I think we are in a very similar scenario here (at least for what I've
understood :).
Cheers,
Stefano
Il giorno sab, 30/06/2012 alle 02.29 +0200, Erlend Oftedal ha scritto:
> Hi
>
> Thank you for replying.
> I was thinking of server generated tokens stored in the users session.
> An app like this would probably get the token in a json together with
> other login information such as username after login.
> An evil server cannot directly get the token because that would
> require stealing the session (as long as we're on https).
> But in this attack it doesn't have to. It just asks a page on the
> victim page to build the request and send it on behalf of the user.
> Yea this is still a CSRF, hence the title. But at least to me it was a
> new subcategory of CSRF.
>
>
> Erlend
>
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
> From: Daniel Herrera
> Sent: 30.06.2012 00:08
> To: websecurity at lists.webappsec.org; Erlend Oftedal
> Subject: Re: [WEB SECURITY] CS#RF (insecure client side rouring)
>
> Erlend,
>
> I can see the unique elements of your example, and yes I have seen
> this in the wild. However, I would still consider your example CSRF
> and not a secondary class of attack.
>
> There are several implementations in the wild that auto-populate a
> required token within a secondary request, that are not related to
> JavaScript frameworks. Depending on the implementation, these can also
> be susceptible to the same abuse case you described.
>
> In addition, there are several follow-up questions I would ask about
> the example you provided:
>
> Is the CSRF token derived client-side or sever-side?
>
> If the token is derived client-side:
> How does the application manage access to the logic that generates
> valid tokens?
> Whats to prevent the attacker from forging valid tokens using the same
> methods?
>
> If the token is derived server-side:
> How does the application protect requests for valid tokens?
> What prevents an attacker from forging these requests and
> sub-stringing the token returned within the response?
>
> Let me know your thoughts and if you feel I missed anything in your
> previous message/blog post.
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Daniel
>
> --- On Fri, 6/29/12, Erlend Oftedal <erlend at oftedal.no> wrote:
>
> From: Erlend Oftedal <erlend at oftedal.no>
> Subject: [WEB SECURITY] CS#RF (insecure client side rouring)
> To: websecurity at lists.webappsec.org
> Date: Friday, June 29, 2012, 10:11 AM
>
> Hi
>
> I was wondering if CS#RF was something being found in the wild
> and tested for?
> Basically this is a CSRF attack against a JS driven app that
> has server side CSRF protection, but is using insecure routing
> on the client side, causing the JS to submit the correct CSRF
> token.
> Consider a blog having the following url:
> http://example.com/blog#/comment/123/delete
> The client side JS picks up on the hash, and builds a secured
> request including CSRF token and off to the server we go.
> So tricking a user to visit a minified url, using an iframe or
> other means of getting an authenticated user to visit the
> link, causes the comment to be deleted.
> Typically single page web apps using a routing framework like
> backbone.js may be vulnerable.
>
> Blog post: http://erlend.oftedal.no/blog/?blogid=130
>
> Best regards
> Erlend
>
>
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