[WEB SECURITY] How are you tackling CSRF?

Sebastian Schinzel ssc at seecurity.org
Tue Apr 26 03:36:20 EDT 2011

Hi Rohit,

On Apr 25, 2011, at 10:06 AM, Rohit Pitke wrote:
> You are basically assuming that there is XSS on some of the requests. If there is no XSS,  even if you keep a value of your CSRF token same as cookies, it wont matter.
> Also, if we correctly implement CSRF on each and every page (including GET), that would automatically mitigate XSS too as a request carrying XSS string wont be accepted on server side. (Provided CSRF token validation is done strictly).
> Thoughts?

It would only mitigate reflected XSS, but not persistent XSS.

In general, I would refrain from telling the developers that CSRF tokens also
mitigate reflected XSS. I fear that the developers could accept this as a 
"best practice to fix XSS" with all the negative implications. 

"Fixing" reflected XSS with CSRF tokens leads to a tightly coupled security
system, because as soon as CSRF protection fails, you have a much bigger
problem with reflected XSS.

Although, CSRF tokens may be temporal fix for reflected XSS that buys you time
to actually fix the reflected XSS with proper output encoding.


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