[WEB SECURITY] RE: XSS-Phishing on Financial Sites (Tip of the iceberg)
rsnake at shocking.com
Sun Jun 25 02:12:19 EDT 2006
A few weeks ago I wrote about this on the blog:
Content restrictions are something Firefox has looked at, but are
lacking the development staff to build. I'm sure they'd appreciate the
help if someone wanted to spend some time building it out, but for the
time being, there are no efforts I am aware of, other than IE appears to
won't solve the issue, but will close one vector).
On Sat, 24 Jun 2006, Brian Eaton wrote:
> On 6/24/06, arian.evans <arian.evans at anachronic.com> wrote:
>> Most home DSL/cable/Router-thingies have changed from GETs to POSTs,
>> that I've looked at, but some POSTable forms still parse GET anyway
>> (maintaining trivially high attack surface).
> Switching to POST doesn't do anything to prevent CSRF, at least not
>> This year we released a homegrown WAF at BH Amsterdam to transparently
>> block these types of attacks, and were *really* excited about it.
>> It was poorly received and I think poorly understood, as I mentioned
>> before, due to presentation deficiencies.
> Even if you don't work on this WAF any further, I think you should
> keep pitching the technique you were using to block XSS and CSRF. XSS
> and CSRF are epidemic, and most of the suggestions for resolving them
> are just picking around the edges of the problem. More comprehensive
> solutions are needed.
> I've been wondering whether web application developers could cooperate
> with browser vendors to find a way to make XSS and CSRF harder to
> exploit. I'm pretty sure that there is nothing a browser can do to
> prevent exploitation of persistent XSS/CSRF vulnerabilities, but for
> the more common "legitimate user visits malicious web site" scenarios
> I suspect browsers could help.
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