[WEB SECURITY] Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: [WEB SECURITY] Cross Site Scripting in Google

Javor Ninov drfrancky at securax.org
Thu Jul 6 00:59:45 EDT 2006

RSnake wrote:
> Just for the record, I should clarify. Google was not notified of this
> exploit prior to full disclosure. As I said, they are notoriously slow
> (or completely delinquent) in fixing these issues historically. If you
> need proof click here to see four redirect issues disclosed nearly 6
> months ago that are still not fixed.
> http://seclists.org/lists/webappsec/2006/Jan-Mar/0066.html
> Here's another one:
> http://www.google.com/url?sa=D&q=http://www.fthe.net
> Typically I don't believe in full disclosure as a release methodology
> (for instance, if I found a remote vulnerability in Microsoft, I
> wouldn't disclose that without giving Microsoft months to release a
> patch as they have taken their patching process very seriously as of
> late and their responsibility in this matter has been far improved).
> Either Google was not convinced when they were used as a phishing relay
> last time, or they do not take this seriously.  Either way, it takes all
> but a few days to patch these issues in a website, QA them and releast
> them, and Google has not done so, making contacting the vendor a useless
> excersize to date, in my opinion.
my opinion is that full disclosure is not for vendors .. it's for users.
full disclosure is for us to know how to react on certain threads. i
personally don't care about the vendors , although my company is a
vendor itself . we also produce software and we also care about security
of our software. but i expect users to post to security groups instead
of mailing me personally. If the vendor cares about his users he should
watch the security groups.

I believe in FULL disclosure
And i think this is the better way.

Javor Ninov aka DrFrancky

> On Wed, 5 Jul 2006, bugtraq at cgisecurity.net wrote:
>> Did you even bother to email them and let them know? Being that
>> they're still vulnerable probably not....
>> - z
>>> Google is vulnerable to cross site scripting attacks.  I found a
>>> function built off their add RSS feed function that returns HTML if a
>>> valid feed is found.  It is intended as an AJAXy (dynamic JavaScript
>>> anyway) call from an inline function and the page is intended to do
>>> sanitation of the function.  However, that's too late, and it returns
>>> the HTML as a query string, that is rendered, regardless of the fact
>>> that it is simply a JavaScript snippet.
>>> Here is the post that explains the whole thing:
>>> http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060704/cross-site-scripting-vulnerability-in-google/
>>> -RSnake
>>> http://ha.ckers.org/
>>> http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html
>>> http://ha.ckers.org/blog/feed/
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> The Web Security Mailing List:
>>> http://www.webappsec.org/lists/websecurity/
>>> The Web Security Mailing List Archives:
>>> http://www.webappsec.org/lists/websecurity/archive/
>>> http://www.webappsec.org/rss/websecurity.rss [RSS Feed]
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> -R
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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