[WEB SECURITY] New two-stage login procedure

Wade Millican WMillican at hutchison.com.au
Wed Dec 13 19:12:22 EST 2006


I agree any CallID/ANI/DNIS data is easily spoofed.  Off the top of my head, clickatell does it for SMSes.  I've played with the hardware/software before to do it for ISDN/Voice calls/payload.  If there was any decent payoffs in this vector, it'd be very very scary...
 
Cheers,
Wade

>>> "Billy Hoffman" <Billy.Hoffman at spidynamics.com> 14/12/2006 9:32 am >>>
ANI != Caller ID. See (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_number_identification).

While CallerID is easier to spoof than an ANI, the barriers to spoof an ANI are lower than they were back in the day. Lucky225 has been doing a lot of cool work in that space over the last several years.

Besides the classic way to spoof an ANI (perform an ANI fail through a 3rd party operator), Esteban pointed out the other, easier way: using an Asterisk box. There was a pretty funny presentation at Toorcon this year (http://www.toorcon.org/2006/conference.html?id=24). Some guy set up an Asterisk box that would ANI spoof to allow you to access anyone's voicemail box. The presenter made up a bunch of business cards and, as he put it "gave them to the most vindictive people I could think of: females 20-somethings."

And good fun was had by all,
Billy Hoffman
--
Lead Researcher, SPI Labs
SPI Dynamics Inc. - http://www.spidynamics.com ( http://www.spidynamics.com/ )
Phone:  678-781-4800
Direct:   678-781-4845

-----Original Message-----
From: Brian Eaton [mailto:eaton.lists at gmail.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2006 12:47 PM
To: Esteban Ribi*i*
Cc: Web Security
Subject: Re: [WEB SECURITY] New two-stage login procedure

On 12/13/06, Esteban Ribi*i* <kisero at gmail.com> wrote:
> a smarter would be:
>
> 1) user calls from a defined number (mobile) to a pbx
> 2) pbx checks any and ask for a code
> 3) pbx replies with a token
>
> user logs with this normal credentials (bank account and password) + token +
> "common pool of questions".
>
> its not expensive...asterisk can do it.

Caller ID spoofing seems like a problem with this system:

http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9822 

Regards,
Brian

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